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Abstract: Recent calls for non-Western translation theories raise the more basic question 
of where Western thought comes from and how it is historically conditioned. Here we 
take the view that the way we translate, and the way we think about translation, depends 
on the problems we are trying to solve. This means that different problems can give rise 
to different theories, so Western problems might have given rise to Western theories. 
More important, this means that when we confront past theories, we should ask what 
specific problems they were trying to solve, without assuming any homogeneous stock of 
universal answers. And when we engage in our own theorizing, be it non-Western or 
simply effective, we should be aware of what specific problems we are trying to solve. 
 This perspective allows some provocative correlations like the following: 
“equivalence” was most needed when Europe and Canada decided to depend on 
translation for their multilingual laws; “dynamic equivalence” was about selling 
Christianity to illiterate communities; “Skopos theory” expressed the aspirations of a 
professional segment of technical translators that sought greater social recognition and 
pay, as well as university departments that sought independence; “Descriptive 
Translation Studies” was seeking the survival of smaller cultures within the West; 
“foreignization” responded to the Germanic privileging of language, to the French search 
for opening to the other, and to a well-intentioned call for American intellectuals to seem 
international in the absence of foreign-language competence; and “non-western” theory is 
a functional simulacrum designed to oppose some of these new Western theories to 
apparently old Western theories, in the spirit of an ageing but still hungry modernism.  
 These correlations should not be seen in a deterministic light. Once you have a 
problem to solve, the ideas you use to solve it can come from anywhere. So we should be 
aware of not just our own problems, but also of what others have done with theirs. And 
this in turn should answer the question of whether we need Eastern or Western ideas, or 
simply ideas that can help solve the problems we face. 




What do we think is Western? 
 
Thought on the nature and qualities of translation has recently been marked by 
critiques of positions seen as Western or, more rarely, Eurocentric. The substance of 
these adjectives is extremely vague, as if everyone knew what was meant. A particularly 
American usage tends to assume that the United States represents the West, and thus that 
Americans’ well-intentioned self-criticism should generously be extended to everything 
west of the Urals. Lawrence Venuti (1995) talks more readily about an “Anglo-
American” translation culture but then refers freely to “Western” traditions as having 
“limited acceptance” of foreignizing (107), as setting up the idea of “Eastern 
irrationality” (159), and as promoting “transparent discourse [...] since antiquity” (306) – 
the American becomes the English language, which somehow becomes the West. The 
New York intellectual constructs his immediate culture as that of half the civilized world.   
Similarly American, Douglas Robinson (1991) more virulently constructs 
“mainstream Western translation theory” as a product of Christian theology, couched in 
the following terms:  
 
“the ideosomatic programming that artificially (culturally) unifies Western 
translation theory” (37)  
 
“Bible translation is even today the model for all Western thought about 
translation” (52)  
 
“Inspiration by the Holy Spirit [...] is the great ideal of all mainstream 
(ideosomatically controlled) Western translation theory” (55)  
 
“the three definitive features of mainstream Western thought about translation [...] - 
dualism, instrumentalism, and perfectionism” (91) 
 
“the disabling contradictions built into the Western metaphysical tradition” (118)  
 
“the restrictive ideosomatics of Western tradition, according to which, as Eugene 
Nida says [...] “Translating means Translating Meaning” (144)  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, those descriptions were written by an American liberal teaching 
in the American Bible belt, where Christianity was possibly the main debate in town. 
Does anyone else in the West want to reduce the whole of our history to the Bible?    
 A third American, Maria Tymoczko, is rather more modest when giving reasons 
“Why European Translators Should Want to De-Westernize Translation Studies” (2007). 
She reduces Western tradition to “transfer” and proposes five apparently non-Western 
concepts that see translation as something other than transfer. For example, an Arabic 
term suggests that to translate is “to pour”, as when a liquid takes a different shape in a 
different vessel. The only problem here is that, as the medievalist within Tymoczko 
surely appreciates, the Latin verb vertere was used in exactly the same way, and the 




 It is easy enough to challenge these thinkers through argument-by-catalogue, 
giving alternative lists of verbs, metaphors, and exceptions to the generalizations. It 
might also be slick to point out some easy contradictions: if binarism is supposedly 
Western, can we go beyond it by manipulating the huge binarism of the West vs. the rest? 
And then, if these claims do escape from Western tradition, how can they explain their 
own ability to do so? And so on.  
 Such debates are standard academic fare, and no one wins except fashion. Here, 
however, I propose a somewhat dirtier mode of questioning: What specific problems 
were these pronouncements designed to solve? That kind of question, I propose, could 
itself be the best solution to the underlying problem of what to do with Western tradition. 
 We will return to the American non-Westerners within a few pages. In the 
meantime, let us run through a few easy examples of how a problem-solving approach 
might handle apparently Western translation theories.  
 
If equivalence is the answer, what was the problem? 
 
Many of the negative aspects of Western translation theory may be summed up in 
the concept of “equivalence”, understood here as a basic relation of equal value between 
two sides of an equation. This would incorporate something of the focus on binarism, the 
relation between texts rather than people, the fixation on meaning (if that comes close to 
“value”), and perhaps something of the notion of transfer (at least to the extent that there 
are two sides involved, and something has to be created on one of those sides).  
It is very difficult to say where the concept of equivalence comes from. Something 
like the concept might be operative in the work of the Valencian scholar Joan Lluís Vives, 
whose De ratione dicendi of 1533 envisages a “third genre” of translation, where “the 
matter and the words are [both] weighed up” (“Tertium genus est, ubi & res & verba 
ponderantur”, 1533: 168v). The interest of the reference is not so much in the “weighing 
up” as a possible search for anything like equal value1
 So why then and there, amid the humanism of the sixteenth century? 
; it is more in the recognition of 
three rather than just two kinds of translation. If this “weighing” is the third kind, what 
are the other two? One pole is extreme literalism, “as if one were trying to transfer into 
other languages the exact words of Demosthenes or Cicero” (ibid.); the other is 
translation according to sense only, “when the translator must be allowed to omit that 
which does not concern the sense, or add whatever might clarify the sense” (ibid.). In 
between these two, we find the reference to a third way.  
 When I first started to study medieval translation practices, initially that of the 
Hispania of the twelfth century, I was frankly shocked at the diversity of what I found. 
Some texts, especially the protoscientific texts rendered from Arabic into Latin, were 
marked by occasional passages so literalist that one wonders how anyone could have 
made much sense of them. There were good reasons for this. First, when the translators 
did not understand what was going on in the Arabic, literalism was the safest bet: perhaps 
                                                 
1 Here we admit to having been initially misled – and over-excited - by the Spanish translation of this 
sentence as: “El tercer género de comentarios es cuando la sustancia y las palabras mantienen su equilibrio 
y equivalencia” (in López García, ed. 1996: 66, italics ours). Rener (1989: 185) also seems slightly 
misleading in his insistence that Vives is classifying no more than types of source texts (here Vives does 




someone else, smarter or a few more centuries down the road, would be able to figure it 
out. Second, medieval thought on translation was marked by a hierarchy of languages, 
where some languages were closer to God and thus more divine. Translation usually went 
from the higher languages to the lower ones. In this context, literalism was a way of 
consciously developing an inferior language by importing resources from a supposedly 
superior one. Hence, for the scientists (although not for the Church), literalism was used 
for translations from Arabic into Latin. At the same time, precisely because the resulting 
translations were hard to understand, there were secondary texts that were more like 
lessons (some may have derived from actual class notes), where things were explained 
rather than translated in our contemporary sense of the word. These explanations might 
be extensive marginal glosses, commentaries, or separate treatments of the same text. 
Clagett (1953) provides an example in his reconstruction of the manuscript traditions for 
Adelardus de Bada’s work on Euclid’s Elements: the first Latin version indicates 
translation directly from an Arabic manuscript; the second, presumably for teaching 
purposes, includes didactic commentaries and omits many of the proofs; the third puts the 
proofs back in. The translator was either literalist, or a teacher.  
 So why did this partition of strategies not work so well in the sixteenth century? 
Presumably it was because humanism gave equal value to languages, setting the rising 
national vernaculars on a theoretical par with Latin. If the hierarchy no longer existed, 
any attempt at extreme literalism lost its ideological justification. The reason for separate 
pedagogical commentary similarly melted away, and the only term left standing is in the 
middle: something like equivalence as attending to both form and content.  
 The new ideology of equivalence, admittedly without the term, coincided with the 
age of national vernaculars, which were supported by their nation states, their printing 
presses, their correspondingly standardized forms, and fixed texts to which it was 
possible to be equivalent. This was especially so in Europe, home of the nation state as a 
frame of governance. Should we then be surprised that equivalence, with the name, came 
to the fore in the translation theory of the 1960s and 1970s, at the very moment when 
European unification required translation for its new supra-national laws and governance, 
with the supportive promulgation of fictions of equal languages? This was when more 
than personal trust in the translator was required if translations were to be considered 
trustworthy - in European law, as in the United Nations, all language versions are 
considered fully valid, such that equivalence becomes a necessary legal fiction, well 
beyond its status as a useful pedagogical aim. Conveniently, of course, the pseudo-
mathematics of the concept coincided happily with the age of structuralism and the 
pretensions of analytical science in the cultural realm. Equivalence was destined to gain 
academic as well as political legitimacy.  
 In parallel, and for entirely different reasons, the cause of evangelical 
missionaries was also served by a notion of equivalence. In the seminal work of Eugene 
Nida, dating from the 1940s but with major texts in the 1960s, equivalence operates 
between two extremes, “formal” and “dynamic”. The thrust of Nida’s work was certainly 
to operate against the traditional literalism of Bible translation, which can be traced back 
to Jerome, and thus to legitimize the more adaptive techniques of “dynamic equivalence”. 
In historical context, though, Nida was implicitly adopting the view that all languages are 
legitimate and equal in expressive capacity, in keeping with the linguistic relativism of 




Luther and the humanism of Vives. At the same time, the possibility of dynamic 
equivalence posited a legitimate compromise between translation and commentary, thus 
removing one of the barriers that had long accrued power to traditionalist churches: for as 
long Bible translations were difficult to understand, priests were necessary to explain the 
scriptures. For Nida and Taber, “no better compliment could come to a translator than to 
have someone say, ‘I never knew before that God spoke my language’.” (1969/2003:173). 
The Christian God probably didn’t, but Nida’s missionaries might, and the illusion of 
immediate presence thus solves many linguistic impediments to evangelism.  
 Why did equivalence became such a powerful and dominant concept in Western 
translation theory? Because, we might posit, it simultaneously solved a series of only 
partly related problems: it provided ideological underpinning for the European nation 
states; it was necessary for multilingual governance; it supported a mode of 
trustworthiness that was supra-personal; it benefited from intellectual scientism; and it 
fitted in with Christian evangelism. It was the appropriate concept for an expansive 
Western culture.  
 Of course, equivalence may not be so good at solving problems in other contexts. 
For example, once globalization undermines the economic power of the nation state, the 
pretence to equal languages no longer operates. And once electronic technologies make 
all texts immediately modifiable, there is no longer any firm source to which we can be 
equivalent. Scientism then succumbed to indeterminism, and even missionaries, in the 
postmodern age, have realized that they profoundly change cultures, albeit beneath the 




From around 1984, the regime of equivalence was strongly challenged by a set of 
German-language theories that have come to sail under the flag of Skopos (more a flag of 
convenience than an exact denomination). Despite the claims that Western translation 
theory is all transfer and binarism, the prime precept here is that translations are done to 
fulfill a target-side purpose (Skopos), which is at least partly defined by the requirements 
of a client. Since purposes and clients change, the one source text can theoretically be 
translated in different ways. Further, since some purposes may require more (or less) than 
translation, translators can be expected, for example, to advise against translating an 
inappropriate text, or to add explanations, or perhaps to write a new version. 
 This paradigm thus allows for the category of “translatorial action”, understood as 
the set of things that translators can do professionally. Figure 1 specifies that 
“translatorial action” is (reading from the top) a mode of communication that is cross-
cultural and mediated. The figure further indicates that actual translations are only one of 






Figure 1. Translation as a form of mediated cross-cultural communication (adapted from Nord 1997: 18) 
  
 
In terms of our historical narrative, this reconceptualization of the translator’s task would 
perhaps be moving us back to the days when mediators could add or delete material at 
will, in accordance with pedagogical and institutional needs. That is, we would be 
moving back to periods prior to the humanism of Vives, indeed prior to the age of 
nationalized languages and print communication. 
 So why should this kind of theorizing have surfaced in Europe in the 1980s? What 
kinds of problems could it have responded to?  
 Some suppositions come easy. One might presume that the trainers of technical 
translators saw their graduates going into jobs where they were called on to do far more 
than translate. Major employers like the incipient software industry (many graduates went 
from Heidelberg and Germersheim into SAP and similar companies) did indeed require 
smart people to do terminology, project management and the like, in a professional 
environment that was later to become the localization industry. In that world, the 
mediator’s work was not on printed text but on electronic communication, where constant 
updates were (and remain) the norm and there are few stable points of departure to which 
one could be equivalent anyway. All that would be a very new set of problems to which 
Skopos theory could have been an elegant set of answers.  
 The only problem with that account, however, is that none of it is mentioned in 
any of the texts of the days. Plough through the collected theorizings of Vermeer, Holz-
Mänttäri, and Nord, and you will be very lucky to find explicit mention of electronic 
communication, software or localization (I have found none). Nor is there any other 
reference to anything that would seem to be a historically new set of translation problems 
- Nord tends to mention the cultural adaptation of tourist brochures, but the tourist 
industry had been around for a long time, and Holz-Mänttäri has intelligent things to say 
about translators working alongside field-experts, but technical expertise was surely 
nothing new either.  
 Instead, the theorizing makes appeals to anthropological logics of eternal 
communication paradigms, to an abstract mode of reason that, under the guise of 
common sense, would be plain to all, in all times and places. Go through those texts, 
consider the arguments, and the one historical problem you consistently find is more 




sense of Skopos. Various appeals are made to the need to “unlearn” the teachings of 
equivalence, linguistic exactitude, and an apparently primitive concept of translation.  
 So why should such arguments have appeared then and there, in the Europe of the 
1980s? In historical hindsight, it is not difficult to divine the logic. This was the age when 
Translation Studies was struggling to establish itself as an academic discipline with 
substantial independence from Linguistics and Literary Studies. To argue that translators 
do more than reproduce texts was thus implicitly a powerful argument against the 
established disciplines that looked at nothing but texts. Skopos theory thus responded to 
the politically motivated problem of defining a new academic space, with all attendant 
chicaneries and self-interests. Beyond the long-established faculties in Germany 
(particularly Heidelberg and Germersheim, where these debates were internal), the wider 
Europe saw the former polytechnics being incorporated into the university system. There 
was thus significant debate as to whether the training of translators and interpreters was 
“academic” enough to warrant an independent place in the evolving systems. This new 
set of theories, with its technical terms and constant appeal to the wider frame of 
translatorial action, was destined to appeal in a historical situation where translator 
trainers sought both legitimacy and independence.  
 Of course, once those historical debates were over (in many cases with the 
successful defense of an independent Translation Studies), Skopos theory was no longer 
solving problems. Not by chance, this is a school of thought that has generally failed to 
evolve beyond the circumstances of its creation.  
 
Why Descriptive Translation Studies? 
 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, roughly in parallel with Skopos theory, the literary side of 
translation theory took an entirely different course. Instead of analyzing translation 
situations and alternatives to traditional equivalence, this paradigm annulled the appeals 
to equivalence: Toury (1980: 63–70) assumed that all translations were always 
equivalent) and more generally (1995) challenged the primacy of the source text (since 
the new focus was on what translations do in target cultures). Both these moves 
contradict the transfer somehow assumed to be part and parcel of Western translation 
theory. Our problem, though, is to explain what kind of problem they might have 
responded to.  
 One possible answer comes from the long-standing European desire to analyze 
cultural products scientifically. Yet that desire, which partly explains the excruciating 
way some of these texts were written, dates from the positivism of the nineteenth century 
– it was in no way a new problem.  
 A second answer would place more emphasis on the kinds of cultures that these 
researchers came from: Israel, the former Czechoslovakia, Flanders, Holland – all 
relatively small language groups receiving translations from larger language groups 
(English, French, German, Russian). Much as this might appear accidental, the statistical 
reality is that relatively small cultures have relatively high percentages of translations on 
their bookshelves. It is only logical that such societies should produce a paradigm where 
what counts is the target system and the role of translations within it.  
 In the process, of course, this mode of theorization virtually annulled the binarism 




therefore conclude that the problems it addressed were somehow not particularly 
European?  
 Once you set up this mode of questioning, the deceptively eternal positions start 




European Translation Studies is supposed to favor domesticating translations, of the kind 
that would conceal the very fact of translation. As we have indicated, things were rather 
different in the pre-humanist age, when the hierarchy of languages meant that one of the 
functions of translation was to help improve inferior languages. Literalism, calques, and 
borrowings were in some cases the prime order of the day, in a general strategy that we 
would nowadays call “foreignization”.  
 The notion of “foreignizing translation” (“verfremdende Übersetzung”) 
nevertheless more properly belongs to European Romanticism, specifically to 
Schleiermacher (1813/1963), where it opposes various concepts of domestication 
(“verdeutschende Übersetzung”). In part, this was thanks to the same hierarchy of 
language, albeit now with a nationalist twist: in order to oppose the cultural hegemony of 
French, which sought inspiration in extreme domestication and principally from Latin, 
Germanic theorists turned to the opposite strategy, making the translation sound strange, 
and electing to privilege Greek. The selection of both strategy and source would thus 
make sense in terms of a nationalism that opposed Napoleon. 
 Why should that strategy have emerged precisely there, and specifically in 
defense of German? Answers are not hard to find. The German language represented a 
culture but not a political state. The language was thus overdetermined as the symbolic 
representation of the culture, and translation theory was destined to be more about the 
status of languages than anything else. Read Schleiermacher, or Benjamin, or Heidegger, 
and you cannot fail to be surprised at how quickly the discussion of translation becomes a 
comparison of languages. Were there no actual translators? Was there no matter to be 
translated? The foreignizing tradition, specifically in German, would seem to have 
followed through from the days when languages were all.  
 What is even stranger, from this perspective, is to follow the ways that same 
tradition has been picked up by others for entirely different purposes. When Antoine 
Berman (1984) sought to introduce German-language Romantic translation theory into 
French, it was scarcely in order to build up and defend the French language. The 
foreignizing aesthetic was instead recast in ethical terms, with cultural openness to the 
other being contrasted against cultural closure. This was in a France marked more 
profoundly by what might be called the “philosophy of dialogue” (in a range of flavors 
from Levinas to Lacan), where the prime value was exchange with the cultural other. The 
appeal to foreignization is still there, but for rather different reasons.  
 One more jump and we reach the defense of foreignization formulated in Venuti 
(1995). The same terms are there, more or less, but now we find no talk of using this 
strategy to build up the status of English (scarcely in an inferior position on any political 
hierarchy), and there is no real concept of dialogue with a cultural other. Venuti’s 
arguments instead hinge on slightly strange writing as a way of getting noticed: if 




and there could perhaps be more cultural diversity within Anglo-American cultural 
hegemony. The conceptual links are extremely tenuous, but the basic problem being 
handled by Venuti is that of making a (monolingual) leftist intellectual culture appear 
international, in an age and in a country where operational knowledge of foreign 
languages is dwindling pitifully. 
 We thus find the notion of foreignization being used to address three quite 





Another quick example: Why did corpus linguistics become a way of analyzing 
translations? Historically, the tool came to the fore in the United Kingdom in the early 
1990s – a convenient landmark is Baker (1993). Part of the reason would be the general 
prestige of scientism and technological toys, all of which was part of the same campaign 
to legitimize Translation Studies within the university system. The same prestige had 
been manipulated by Descriptive Translation Studies (which had similarly pretended to 
surpass a “pre-scientific” age), not to mention the re-naming programs of Skopos theory 
(with its calls to “unlearn” the lessons of tradition). So what was new in corpus 
linguistics? It could scarcely claim to be doing any kind of exact science, since it was 
using a quantitative tool in the apparent absence of probabilistic statistics. Yet it 
somehow succeeded.  
 One of the most innovative moves made by the corpus linguistics was to compare 
corpora of translations in English with corpora of non-translations also in English. In 
theory, this comparison would enable researchers to identify the linguistic features 
specific to translational English (features then dressed up as possible “universals” of 
translation). Why this research method caught on must seem something of a mystery. 
After all, translation universals had been hypothesized in work done by the Tel Aviv 
School in the early 1980s (see Pym 2010: 78-81), and it was scarcely a burning issue for 
practitioners or theorists in other parts of the world. The concept had none of the 
transformationalist power of Chomsky’s early appeal to universals.  
 One reason behind this peculiar success might be found in the pressures on British 
universities to attract international students. Students from all over the world do indeed 
pay hefty fees to study in an environment that speaks English, and the study and teaching 
of English is, not surprisingly, a major industry. It follows that Applied Linguistics is 
particularly successful in the United Kingdom, and that most of the translation research 
done in that country has remained within that field. That is why a tool used to analyze 
language use could become a tool for analyzing the language in translation – in apparent 
oblivion of the fact that corpora of this kind have only rarely been used as professional 
translation tools, and completely in parallel to the professional use of bi-text corpora in 
translation memories. No matter. The great beauty of this particular piece of Applied 
Linguistics is that it becomes possible to study translation entirely in English: the corpus 
of translations is in English, and so is the corpus of non-translations. Why should anyone 
want to study translations entirely in English? The financial argument is fairly obvious: 




translation, without the teaching staff having to go through all the bother of learning, 
teaching, or analyzing foreign languages. A major organizational problem is thus solved.  
 (Note also that the same trick works with the apotheosis of theory: students are 
asked to theorize their translation problems in English, and are then evaluated on that, 
rather than on the actual translation. And the overarching conceit is to play on the term 
“Translation Studies”, pretending that an academic discipline of research and theory can 
also mean “studying to be a translator”. N’importe quoi...)  
 As is well known, the monolingual study of translation remains fundamentally 
unable to model the causation of what it finds (if translational language is different, can 
the causes of that difference be found in a corpus?), just as it willfully does away with the 
problematics of cultural alterity. We note, however, that this school has very few of the 
features that are supposed to be essential to Western translation theory.  
 
Why cultural translation? 
 
A parting shot: Since the late 1990s, one trend in English-language translation theory has 
been to study relations between cultures in terms of translation. The landmark work here 
would be Homi Bhabha’s The Location of Culture (1994), which associates the term 
“cultural translation” with the dynamics of cultural hybridity, particularly in contexts of 
decolonization and immigration. In opposition to the fundamental binarism of source vs. 
target, here we have a model of multiple mixes and overlaps, where translation of 
necessity loses any simple directionality.  
 Without chasing up the diverse metaphorics of this concept of translation, let us 
simply locate what problem it might have responded to. Part of the answer requires little 
guesswork: postcolonial societies, in both the colonies and the metropolises, have 
become culturally complex, to the point where few actual transfers occur between 
entirely distinct systems. This explains the attraction of a notion of translation that 
recognizes complexity and is able to undo the naïve binarism of previous models. 
Problem solved.  
 Let us consider for a moment the historical reasons why literary theorists, now 
self-recycled as cultural theorists, would want to turn to the concept of translation. If we 
go back to the 1980s, translation theorists in the “descriptive” camp were complaining 
about mainstream literary scholarship sidelining translations, not considering them 
serious objects of study, and too readily assuming cultures to be discrete systems (see, for 
example, the various complaints in Hermans 1985). That is, the binarisms were being 
used by literary theorists themselves, particularly in their division of academic space into 
separate “literatures” (with Comparative Literature as a category for general theory and 
left-overs). Seen from that perspective, the new metaphorics of translation respond to a 
problem internal to literary theory itself – the problem of basically binary categories. 
“Cultural translation” does not solve any problem that concerns actual translations.  
 Does this mean Translation Studies has somehow been brought in from the cold? 
Hardly. What has been taken from translation is little more than its conceptual geometry: 
the idea that something can be communicated across differences, so there is a space in 
which the same and the other are both operative, and translation is always transformation. 
From that basic idea, for which no more than a reading of Walter Benjamin is de rigueur, 




travel, cultural heritage, multicultural governance, and the rest. The last thing anyone in 
this paradigm wants to do is actually analyze a set of translations. That is simply not the 
problem that had to be solved.  
 Of course, they then turn around and say that the traditional study of translations 
is concerned with no more than accuracy and equivalence (cf. Apter 2006: 5), which are 
presented as sad illusions that the experts in cultural translation can now dispel.  
 But that was not the problem we started from here.  
 
Different problems, same solutions? 
 
More examples could be given. The basic points should nevertheless be clear enough by 
now: 
 
1.  Very few of these theories actually fit into the mould created by those who talk 
about “Western translation theory”: pre-humanist literalism and pedagogy, Skopos, 
target-side descriptivism, foreignization, corpora, and cultural translation are not 
precisely models of essentialist transfer. So are they perhaps not Western?  
  
2. In many cases, we find the one translation concept being used to solve different 
intellectual problems, in different periods and institutional circumstances. This 
means that the theories are not being produced or determined by the problems, in 
the way that a question might determine a simple answer. If you will, the one 
answer can help address several very different questions.  
 
These two points should now help us suggest what could be done with the history of 
translation theory.  
 First, why should anyone want to divide the world of solutions into something as 
banal as the West vs. the rest? What is the problem addressed by Americans falling over 
themselves to write off the West? The theorists cited at the beginning of the paper – 
Venuti, Robinson, Tymoczko – would hopefully find quite a few good things in the 
various theories we have mentioned above. They would readily concede that there are 
exceptions to the rules, and that their criticisms were only directed at what they identify 
as the benightedness of “mainstream” theorizing. Fair enough. So the problem being 
addressed is not really that of the West vs. the rest, but of “new” Western vs. “old”, and 
implicitly “good” vs. “bad”. In short, the virtue of the non-Western has been conscripted 
into an argument for progress, wholly within the ideology of an expansionist modernism. 
Or are any of these theorists exceptionally aware of non-Western translation theories?  
 Second, if the one solution can help solve various different problems, there is no 
reason to discard any set of theories simply because of the circumstances in which they 
were produced. An idea from the West might help solve a problem from the East (or 
North, or South), and vice versa. And no idea is going to be superior simply because it 





What is to be done? 
 
From the above, it does not follow that you should go out and study a lot of different 
translation theories simply in the brave hope that one idea might one day be useful.  
 On the contrary, a lot of basic effort has to be invested in the serious identification 
of problems requiring solution, here and now, for a particular society or set of societies. It 
is not for me to try to list those problems: they will be those of the translators, professions, 
institutions, technologies and cultures around you. They may be of the kind you will read 
about in notes from afar (this week’s list might include the specifics of Asian languages, 
sustainability, machine translation, interactive technologies, and volunteer translation), 
but they are more likely to be the ones that rise up and hit you, when you are looking the 
other way.  
 Then, once you have the problem, go in search of the ways others have tried to 
solve it, or problems like it. A good solution will be good because it helps you name, 
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